

# The Global Life-Cycle Optimizer – Analyzing Fiscal Policy’s Potential to Dramatically Distort Labor Supply and Saving\*

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## Abstract

Fiscal policy in the U.S. and other countries renders intertemporal budgets non-differentiable, non-convex, and discontinuous. Consequently, assessing work and saving responses to policy requires global optimization. This paper develops the Global Life-Cycle Optimizer (GLO), a stochastic pattern-search algorithm. The GLO robustly, precisely, and quickly locates global optima in highly complex fiscal settings. We use the GLO to study how a stylized U.S. fiscal system distorts workers’ labor supply and saving assuming standard preferences. The system incorporates kinks from federal personal income tax brackets, Social Security’s FICA tax, and a notch from the provision of basic income below a threshold. The GLO reproduces theoretically predicted earnings bunching and flipping over a remarkably wide range of wage rates. Saving distortions can be equally dramatic. Associated excess burdens range from substantial to massive. Restricting labor supply to full- or part-time work can eliminate flipping when it’s optimal and produce flipping when it’s sub-optimal. Joint filing can significantly reduce the earnings of lower-wage spouses relative to that of higher-wage spouses. The GLO can be applied to assess a country’s or state’s full set of work and saving disincentives. Consequently, it can facilitate analyses of structural labor supply and tax reform.

**Keywords:** Benefits, Consumption, Distortions, Excess Burden, Global Optimization, Labor Supply, Taxation.

**JEL Classification Codes:** H2, H3, H30, H32, J22, I38

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# 1 Introduction

Fiscal systems in many countries are extraordinarily complex thanks to a plethora of national and state tax and benefit policies. These policies generally come with program-specific eligibility conditions and highly non-linear net payment schedules. Both sets of provisions can depend on a range of economic and demographic factors. These include labor income, asset income, total income, wealth, purchases of particular goods and services, marital status, and the presence of children. Kinks in budget sets from changes in tax brackets are routine. So are notches arising from benefit eligibility and tax thresholds.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, choice sets are intertemporally intertwined, as future net tax schedules are endogenous to current decisions. Thus, saving more this year means more future asset income. This can place a worker in higher future income-tax brackets or leave them ineligible for future income-tested benefits. The prevalence of highly complex, intertemporal budget constraints is no surprise. Politicians signal their value added by enacting new policies. In so doing, they rarely consider the impact on work or saving incentives let alone economy-wide efficiency. The U.S. is a case in point. Its fiscal system features over 1000 tax and benefit programs comprising federal programs, state programs, and 51 state-specific versions of federal programs.

Understanding the effects of fiscal complexity falls on economists. The challenge is handling non-differentiable, non-convex, and discontinuous (NND) intertemporal budget sets. In such environments, work and saving responses cannot be assessed by relying on first-order optimality conditions. Instead, they require global optimization to identify the best of all affordable age-consumption and age-leisure paths. But feasible global-solution methods must avoid the *curse of dimensionality*, i.e. computation requirements rising exponentially in the dimensionality of the problem – in this case, the large number of continuous choices made over the life cycle.<sup>2</sup> This paper develops the *Global Life-Cycle Optimizer* or GLO. The GLO randomly searches for globally optimal annual consumption and labor-supply paths building on the pattern search literature (see Torczon, 1997; Audet and Dennis, 2003). In each iteration, the GLO considers several potential improvements to the current guess. These are generated by adjusting a randomly chosen subset of consumption and labor supply decisions while imposing lifetime budget balance and penalizing violations of cash-flow constraints. The algorithm considers ever larger steps when improvements are found, ever smaller steps when none are found, and stops when the step size falls below a specified minimum.

Given the GLO’s simplicity, its performance is remarkable. We first introduce the GLO and illustrate its speed, accuracy, and robustness. Next we consider a stylized non-differentiable NND net-tax schedule comprising just three elements – the U.S. federal income-tax brackets, Social Security’s FICA tax, and basic income support. Income support is limited to those earning less than a threshold amount set at roughly half the annual earnings of minimum-wage workers.<sup>3</sup> Depending on the worker’s wage, this modest set of fiscal provisions can produce earnings *bunching* and earnings *flipping* over remarkably wide ranges of the earnings distribution. Earnings bunching entails earning just below higher marginal tax and benefit-eligibility thresholds. Earnings flipping references supplying small amounts of labor in some years and high amounts in others. These policy-induced major labor supply reductions dramatically lower annual saving and, consequently, wealth at retirement. Earnings bunching has long been theoretically predicted (see Moffitt, 1983; Burtless, 1976) and empirically documented (see Kotlikoff et al., 1978; Friedberg, 1998, 2000). More recently, economists have used

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<sup>1</sup>E.g., U.S. Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income programs, Section-8 housing thresholds, and Medicare Part B IRMAA premium thresholds.

<sup>2</sup>A different form of the *curse* is often encountered in dynamic stochastic economic models, even absent NND constraints, when the number of continuous *states* becomes large (see, e.g., Brumm and Scheidegger, 2017).

<sup>3</sup>This notch proxies for the complete loss of Medicaid, Section-8 housing, Supplemental Security Income, and other benefits from earning beyond specified limits.

bunching behavior to infer labor supply elasticities (see, e.g., Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2010), with other economists questioning whether these measures are properly identified (see Blomquist et al., 2021). Earnings flipping across years is also the theoretically expected response to NND frontiers. It permits workers to partially convexify their lifetime budget sets – to work less and pay lower taxes, on average, over one’s workspan. Here, again, evidence supports theory. Gustman and Steinmeier (1983, 1984) report that a substantial share of workers spend major portions of their working lives in part-time work. These and others studies indicate substantial heterogeneity in “retiring,” with some workers retiring gradually, others doing so abruptly, and many retiring and then un-retiring, typically to part-time work (see Rust, 1989).

To demonstrate GLO’s versatility, we consider discrete labor choice, joint taxation of married couples’ earnings, and taxation of total income. Discrete choice references limiting the choice set to working either what we define as full time or what we define as part time in a given year. Doing so can lead to flipping when it would otherwise not arise. It can also eliminate flipping when it would arise were the worker unconstrained. Hence, restricting workers to part- or full-time work is hardly a benign assumption. Taxing married couples jointly has the theoretically predicted (see, e.g., Kaygusuz, 2010; Guner et al., 2012; Bick and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2018) impact of discouraging the relative labor supply of lower-wage spouses. Here, as elsewhere, the GLO not only evinces what theory predicts and data confirm. It also provides a quantitative sense of fiscal distortions. Our third extension is taxing total income, i.e., asset as well as labor income. This intertemporally intertwines taxes in the present with those in the future. It not only, as expected, alters the age-consumption profile. It can also limit current earnings and saving to limit future taxes.

## 1.1 Our Stylized Fiscal System and Assumptions on Preferences

Our net-tax schedule comprises three elements. The first is a wage tax that includes the seven brackets of the U.S. 2022 federal personal income-tax. Table 2 reports these brackets and their associated marginal tax rates. Figure 2 depicts these brackets by plotting after-tax against pre-tax income.<sup>4</sup> The second is the 12.4 percent Social Security payroll (FICA) tax levied up to its 2022 \$147,000 ceiling ignoring, as is standard (see Burtless, 1976), marginal Social Security benefit-tax linkage.<sup>5</sup> The third element is the provision of \$10,000 in basic income for those earning less than \$15,000. Figure 1 shows a static budget constraint (ignoring saving), including all three elements.


Our time-separable preference structure is drawn from the standard King et al. (1988) class. Period-specific utility is the log of consumption less a labor-supply parameter times an isoelastic function of labor supply. Agents begin work at 25, retire at 65, and die at 85. Given our chosen equal interest and time preference rates, optimal age-consumption profiles are flat absent binding cash-flow constraints. This holds despite the nature of wage taxation. The optimal age-labor supply profile is also flat when real wages are constant and workers face either lump-sum taxes or linear wage taxes. Consequently, in most of our exercises, the shapes and levels of workers’ age labor-supply profiles convey, at a glance, policy distortions. Absent non-linear taxes, our preferences dictate identical constant labor supply through retirement regardless of the worker’s wage rate, i.e., income and substitution effects fully offset.

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<sup>4</sup>Our stylized policy taxes, for much of the paper, only labor income. This isolates fiscal impacts on labor supply and, given our posited preferences, associated changes to saving. Focusing on labor-income taxation is for illustrative purposes. The GLO is fully capable of handling total-income taxation, as we show in section 6.

<sup>5</sup>This assumption is reasonable given Social Security’s immense complexity. The system provides just 12 benefits, but has 2728 basic rules about the 12 benefits in its Handbook. And its Program Operating Manual System has 20,000 pages of rules about the 2728 rules about the 12 benefits.

Figure 1: Stylized Static Budget Constraint with Kinks and Notch



Note: This static budget constraint includes a convex kink from the FICA tax, two concave kinks from changes in income-tax brackets, and a notch from the claw-back threshold for basic income. For illustrative purposes, this figure abstracts from the intertemporal dimension of the life-cycle optimization problem.

## 1.2 Overview of Findings

Our principle finding is simply the ability of the GLO to determine global solutions quickly, precisely, and robustly in complex settings. Quickly refers to running young households with 60-year lifespans to completion in minutes. Precisely references recovering analytically determined solutions to, in most cases, five decimal places. Robustly references finding the same optimum regardless of the GLO's starting guess.

As indicated, the GLO reproduces theoretically-predicted and empirically-documented labor supply behaviors. What's surprising is the wide range of wages over which it occurs. One would expect major bunching around the \$15,000 earnings level to avoid loss of basic income. But it also occurs for workers with quite high levels of wages who work less to lower their tax bracket from the 32 percent to 24 percent. The impact on labor supply from earnings bunching can be massive – up to 51.1% in our setting. This change is relative to labor supply under equal annual lump-sum taxation. For workers whose wages are fixed through time, earnings bunching, when it arises, generally entails setting their labor to a fixed lower level. For workers with growing real wages, earnings bunching entails working less each year. This occurs until wages grow sufficiently to reach a threshold. At this point, it pays to work more and, thereby, take advantage of the higher gross wage despite moving into a higher tax bracket.

In addition to permanently lowering their labor supply, workers, depending on their wage rates, will flip back and forth between high and low labor supply. Flippers may switch between earning just before the notch or a kink in some years and working substantially more in others years, notwithstanding facing higher marginal net taxation. Workers near the FICA kink are particularly prone to flip. Since the FICA kink is concave, it induces the opposite of bunching namely a desire to spend part of one's working years working intensively above the Social Security taxable earnings ceiling. The reason is to garner a higher net wage. Obviously, this behavior depends on preferences. A higher or lower time-preference rate would, for example, change the range of wage rates that admit particular behaviors. More interestingly, as we show, small differences in time preference for a given interest rate can produce dramatically different timings of labor supply for workers who flip. Stated differently, the

precise timing of labor supply can be hypersensitive to parameter values. Moreover, for a given set of parameter values, the timing of flipping appears quite arbitrary and this timing is highly sensitive to the worker’s wage rate. Another key finding is the extreme sensitivity of life-cycle saving to the fiscal system. Wealth at retirement is, in our worst-case finding, 40 percent lower than it would be with equal-annual lump sum taxes.

Flipping between part-time and over-time work may also be optimal for workers with only those two options. But, as we show, if one imposes discrete labor-supply choice for computational convenience, i.e., when such constraints do not, in fact, exist, the resultant constrained optimum can deviate dramatically from the unconstrained optimum. For example, constraining agents to work either part- or full-time when they aren’t so constrained can lead to flipping when it would otherwise not arise. It can also preclude flipping when flipping would arise. This is the first of three extensions to our primary analysis. The second studies labor supply of married couples subject to joint taxation. As theory predicts, joint progressive taxation can induce more work by the higher wage spouses and less work by the lower wage spouse. Our third extension considers total income rather than only labor income taxation. As we show, taxing total income distorts the age-consumption profile and can lead to flipping for part of one’s working life, but not the rest.

We also find moderate to exceptionally large excess burdens measured relative to lump-sum taxation. These values are highly sensitive to workers’ wages and fiscal provisions. With all three fiscal elements in place, low-wage workers experience excess burdens ranging as high as 26 percent. This reflects the presence of the notch at \$15,000 leading, for example, a worker with a full-time wage of \$30,000 to earn, annually, only \$15,000 to forego sacrificing the otherwise available \$10,000 in basic income. Absent the basic-income-cum-clawback policy, excess burdens are far smaller. In the case of the \$30,000 full-time wage worker, excess burden with all fiscal elements is 26 percent. Absent the provision of basic income with its clawback notch, excess burden is only 2 percent. Given the full policy’s massive distortion, does it leave the \$30,000 worker significantly better off? The answer, surprisingly, is yes. The worker’s welfare ends up 27 percent higher. While the worker’s annual consumption falls by 19 percent their annual labor supply falls by 55 percent. Still, inducing the poor not to work may have major social costs not included in this model.<sup>6</sup>

Table 1 conveys our most important bottom line. It shows that even a relatively simple tax system will lead workers, across a wide range of wage rates, to modify their labor supply by bunching or flipping. These are, of course, extreme behaviors. They arise when consumption and leisure are reasonably good substitutes – our base case. But they also occur when our assumed Frisch elasticity is relatively low. This would be surprising were the fiscal system simply rotating linear budget frontiers. But they are dramatically altering the shapes of budget frontiers, inducing discrete rather than marginal changes in behavior.

### 1.3 Related Literature

The early literature considering responses to kinks and notches (aka cliffs) includes Kotlikoff et al. (1978), Zabalza et al. (1980), Danziger and Plotnick (1981), Moffitt (1983), Hausman (1985), Pencavel (1986), Fraker and Moffitt (1988), Rust (1989), Moffitt (1992), Hoynes (1996), Hagstrom (1996), Keane and Moffitt (1998), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), Eklöf and Sacklén (2000), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), Moffitt (2002), Moffitt (2003), and Blundell and Hoynes (2004). More recent studies, including Saez (2010), Chetty et al. (2010), Brown (2013), Bastani and Selin (2014), Blomquist et al. (2021), and Bertanha et al. (2023), further document bunching, use observed bunching to estimate la-

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<sup>6</sup>This potentially includes not getting married due to the loss of benefits that doing so would entail. See, in this regard, Ilin et al. (2022). This, in turn, means a higher share of children growing up, in poverty with a single parent.

Table 1: Labor Supply Behavior

Wage Range	Features of Labor Supply
– \$30k	bunching at claw back threshold
\$30k – \$45k	flipping between claw back threshold and above
\$45k – \$82k	no flipping or bunching
\$82k – \$83k	bunching at convex kink at \$89,075
\$83k – \$123k	no flipping or bunching
\$123k – \$135k	flipping around concave FICA kink
\$135k – \$144k	no flipping or bunching
\$144k – \$152k	bunching at convex kink at \$170,050
\$152k – \$193k	no flipping or bunching
\$193k – \$196k	bunching at convex kink at \$215,950
\$196k –	no flipping or bunching (except at \$539k kink)

bor supply elasticities, and question whether bunching data suffices to identify underlying behavioral parameters.

Of most relevance to our paper are those recognizing the need for global search and implementing global search routines. Burtless (1976)’s seminal paper suggested using piece-wise linear budget constraints (PLB) to compare utility along different segments of non-convex budget frontiers. Comparing, for given preference parameters, indirect utility along each constraint as well as direct utility at kink points revealed the global optimum. Unfortunately, the PLB approach becomes computationally infeasible when expanded to multiple fiscal programs let alone multiple periods. Consequently, Burtless (1976), Friedberg (1998), Friedberg (2000), and others using PLB do so primarily within static (one-period) models featuring a limited number of fiscal programs. PLB’s computational constraints as well as the presence, in the data, of households making theoretically dominated labor supply decisions led MaCurdy et al. (1990) to approximate kinked and notched frontiers with smoothed functions. In so doing, they were able to incorporate wage-rate measurement error, which could explain observed dominated choices as well as permit testing rationality (Slutsky) conditions. Yet, smooth frontiers can’t explain earnings bunching or discrete changes in labor supply from year to year. Zabalza et al. (1980), Fraker and Moffitt (1988), and Keane and Moffitt (1998) take a different approach to computing global optima of structural models. They drastically restrict the choice set. Specifically, households must consume their current income, i.e., they can neither save nor dis-save. And labor supply is restricted to zero work, part-time work, or full-time work in static contexts. Blundell and Shephard (2012) examine UK tax reform, including the use of tagging and imperfect observations on hours work. Theirs is also a static model, but incorporates six different discrete choices of labor supply.

Assuming single-period agents facing discrete labor-supply constraints comes at a price. Clearly, most households do save or dis-save. Yes, many households, particularly those with low incomes, are cash-flow constrained. But the degree to which their constraints bind is endogenous to future household choices. And restricting labor supply to three discrete options can rule out or rule in suboptimal behavior when such constraints don’t apply. Indeed, we offer an example in which discretizing labor supply can, depending on the definition of part-time and full-time, lead to flipping when it otherwise would not arise. It can also preclude flipping when it would otherwise arise. Defining full-time and part-time work also begs the question of measurement. Full-time work for newly minted lawyers and doctors is generally 60 or more hours per week, not 40 hours. As for part-time work, there are

many means of working fewer hours during a year.<sup>7</sup> Expanding the discrete choice set limits concern about mis-specifying the options. Blundell and Shephard (2012) report that specifying more than six options makes little difference to their results. The literature, e.g., Keane and Moffitt (1998), also stresses the need to incorporate welfare stigma given the high degree of non-participation in particular public-assistance programs. Our illustration of GLO abstracts from this critical concern, but including stigma in preferences seems eminently feasible.

Like Keane and Moffitt (1998), Rust (1989, 1990) pursue global analysis via discretization. But Rust proposes incorporating intertemporal choice by implementing discrete-state dynamic programming. He also limits consumption and labor supply to discrete values. However, he too readily acknowledges computational limits. For example, fully considering Social Security requires treating all past covered earnings as state variables. The GLO avoids this concern that renders high-dimensional dynamic programming infeasible due to the curse of dimensionality. Rust sidesteps this problem by assuming Social Security benefits are determined by average past-covered earnings. These studies incorporate uncertainty to facilitate realistic empirical analysis. Our goal is far simpler – clarifying, based on assumed behavioral parameters, the nature of potential responses to NND policy. Stated differently, we seek to describe/characterize complex fiscal policies in terms of the responses they can induce assuming benchmark preferences. This is a very different objective from measuring the precise responses of workers to specific policies.

We also don’t claim to have found the only global optimizer able to find optima of deterministic NND life-cycle models. In developing the GLO, we tried a variety of off-the-shelf global optimizers, without success, before developing our stochastic pattern searching routine. But other routines might be able to match GLO’s performance.<sup>8</sup> One might also ask whether neural nets could help find global solutions in our setting. Azinovic et al. (2022), Maliar et al. (2021), and Duarte et al. (2021) demonstrate the impressive power of machine learning to handle complex life-cycle problems, including various forms of uncertainty. Yet, as discussed in Duarte et al. (2021), machine learning is ill suited for dealing with NND frontiers due to its reliance on differentiability.

## 1.4 Organization of this Paper

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out our life-cycle optimization problem and details our tax system. Section 3 presents GLO and demonstrates its accuracy. Section 4 scrutinizes the response of labor supply to kinks and notches in the tax code. Section 5 reports the quantitative impact of different tax schemes on labor supply and wealth at retirement; it also measures and decomposes our tax system’s excess burden. Section 6 presents extensions, and section 7 concludes.

## 2 Our Life-Cycle Problem

Our life-cycle model is simple apart from assumed kinks and notches in the net tax schedule. Depending on the case under consideration, income will reference either wage income or total (wage plus asset) income.

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<sup>7</sup>The list includes working less intensely per hour, working fewer hours per day, working fewer days per week, and working fewer weeks per year. Hence, setting part-time work to the same, say, 20 hours per week for 52 weeks for all workers may be problematic.

<sup>8</sup>See Arnoud et al. (2019) for a comparison of alternative global optimizers.

## 2.1 Lifetime Utility

Households live for  $T$  periods with lifetime utility given by

$$\sum_{t=1}^T \left( \frac{1}{1 + \rho_t} \right)^{t-1} U(c_t, l_t), \quad (1)$$

where  $\rho_t$  is the (potentially time-varying) time preference rate,  $c$  is consumption, and  $l$  is labor supply. We assume that per-period (annual) utility obeys the commonly-applied King et al. (1988) additively separable functional form,

$$U(c, l) = \log c - \chi \frac{l^{1+1/\gamma}}{1 + 1/\gamma}, \quad (2)$$

where  $\gamma$  is the Frisch elasticity and  $\chi$  is a scaling parameter, which is set to 1 for most of the analysis.

Households work for the first  $R$  periods only, thus  $l_t = 0$  for  $t > R$ . The per-period budget constraint in  $t$  is:

$$c_t + a_{t+1} = w_t l_t + (1 + r_t) a_t - \mathcal{T}(y_t), \quad (3)$$

where  $a_t$  are the beginning-of-period assets,  $w_t$  is the wage rate,  $r_t$  is the interest rate on assets,  $\mathcal{T}_t$  is the net-tax function, and  $y_t = w_t l_t$  is labor income.<sup>9</sup> Note that if the after-tax wage rate is constant and the interest rate equals the time preference rate,  $r_t = \rho_t$ , labor supply is constant and independent of  $\gamma$ . We focus on examples satisfying this assumption since it implies that any deviation from a constant age labor-supply profile reflects the kinks or notches of our net tax schedule.

Throughout the paper, we set the period length to be one year, and for the most part, we make the following parameter choices. We set the annual interest rate on assets and the time preference rate to 2 percent. For the Frisch elasticity, we choose a value of 1, which is among the higher range of values found in the empirical literature (see Chetty et al., 2011). We assume that households in the model have an economic lifespan of 60 years, in which they work for 40 years. Finally, agents are not able to borrow, that is  $a_{t+1} \geq 0$  for all  $t$ .

## 2.2 Our Stylized Tax System

We consider net-tax codes with  $n$  tax brackets, each characterized by cutoff value  $b$ , intercept  $x$ , and proportional tax rate  $\tau$ :

$$\mathcal{T}(y_t) = \begin{cases} x_1 + t_1 y_t & \text{if } y_t \in [0, b_1] \\ x_i + t_i (y_t - b_{i-1}) & \text{if } y_t \in ]b_{i-1}, b_i], \quad \text{for } i = 2, \dots, n-1, \\ x_n + t_n (y_t - b_{n-1}) & \text{if } y_t \in ]b_n, \infty[. \end{cases}$$

Our baseline net-tax schedule comprises three components. First, the 2022 US single’s tax brackets reported in table 2. Second, Social Security’s 12.4 percent FICA tax on labor earnings through \$147,000.<sup>10</sup> Third, a basic income of \$10,000 paid to those with incomes below \$15,000 – a proxy

<sup>9</sup>We consider taxing total income, i.e.  $y_t = w_t l_t + r_t a_t$ , in section 5.

<sup>10</sup>There is no ceiling on the 2.7 percent FICA tax. In what follows, the FICA tax denotes only the Social Security portion of the overall FICA tax. We also treat the division of “employer” and “employee” portions of the FICA tax as economically irrelevant; i.e., we assume workers bear the full tax regardless of how the remittance of the full tax by employers to the government are labeled. The notch can be viewed as proxying for welfare-benefit thresholds arising under the Supplemental Security Income, Medicaid, Section-8 Housing, and other programs.



for welfare-benefit thresholds arising under the Supplemental Security Income, Medicaid, Section-8 Housing, and other programs. In addition to considering this baseline schedule we also present results assuming just income taxation,  $\mathcal{T}_I$ , and just income and FICA taxation,  $\mathcal{T}_{IF}$ . When comparing the three schedules we denote the baseline tax schedule by  $\mathcal{T}_{IFB}$  and refer to the three schedules as “INC.”, “INC.+FICA”, and “INC.+FICA+BASIC”. Note that the income-tax scheme has convex kinks only, that the FICA tax adds a non-convex kink at the FICA threshold (see figure 3), and that the baseline tax code exhibits a notch at the claw-back threshold for basic income (see figure 4).

Table 2: Tax Brackets and Marginal Tax Rates

Taxable Income	Marginal Tax Rate
\$0 – \$10,275	10%
\$10,275 – \$41,775	12%
\$41,775 – \$89,075	22%
\$89,075 – \$170,050	24%
\$170,050 – \$215,950	32%
\$215,950 – \$539,000	35%
\$539,000+	37%

Note: Tax brackets for single filers in 2022, see [www.forbes.com](http://www.forbes.com).

Figure 2: Income Tax – Convex Kinks Only




Figure 3: Income Plus FICA Tax – Convex and Concave Kinks





Figure 4: Income Plus FICA Tax Code With Basic Income – Notch at Claw-Back Threshold



### 3 The Global Life-Cycle Optimizer

This section presents the GLO algorithm and then showcases its ability to solve highly non-convex life-cycle problems.

#### 3.1 The Algorithm

The GLO algorithm is a variant of pattern search – a well established global optimization method.<sup>11</sup> The basic algorithm seeks the global maximum of a function  $f : \mathbb{R}^N \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ . Starting from an arbitrary point,  $x^0 \in \mathbb{R}^N$ , it generates a sequence of points that weakly improve the objective function,  $f(x_{k+1}) \geq f(x_k)$ . To generate the next point in the sequence,  $x_{k+1}$ , the algorithm carries out a so-called polling step.<sup>12</sup> In each polling step a set of  $J$  points, the poll set, is constructed by moving from the current point in  $J$  different directions, i.e. adding  $J$  different vectors to  $x_k$ . Each of these  $J$  vectors is given by multiplying a spanning direction  $d \in D = \{d^1, \dots, d^J\}$  with a scalar  $m$ , called the mesh size.<sup>13</sup> The poll set is thus given by:

$$\mathcal{P} = \{x_k + m \cdot d : d \in D\} \tag{4}$$

If one of the points in the poll set improves the objective function relative to the current point,  $f(p) > f(x_k)$ , the poll is called successful and the point that achieves this improvement becomes the current point in the next iteration,  $x_{k+1} = p$ .<sup>14</sup> If no improvement is found,  $f(p) \leq f(x_k)$  for all  $p \in \mathcal{P}$ , then the current point is retained for the next iteration,  $x_{k+1} = x_k$ . Furthermore, if the poll was successful, the mesh size is increased such that the algorithm “zooms out” and considers a larger space to find further improvements. In the case of an unsuccessful poll, the mesh size is reduced, i.e., it “zooms in.” The procedure continues until the mesh size falls below a given threshold. Our life-cycle problem consists of finding the agent’s paths of consumption and labor supply that maximize lifetime utility subject to per-period cash-flow constraints.

To apply pattern search to this specific optimization problem, we make three substantial adjustments to the basic algorithm. First, when constructing elements of the poll set we simultaneously consider changes in three, not one, dimension. We draw two of these dimensions randomly – reflecting the idea that there are trade-offs between consumption (or labor supply) in different periods, or between consumption and labor supply. In addition, we always adjust terminal consumption to ensure lifetime budget balance, that is, all remaining assets are consumed in the last period. The second modification entails making the change in one of the chosen dimensions stochastic, replacing the mesh size with a random number drawn from a uniform distribution on an interval around the mesh size. As a third adjustment to the basic algorithm, we include (quadratic) penalty terms for points that violate the cash-flow constraints. Our objective function is thus realized lifetime utility minus quadratic loss functions. Achieving convergence is facilitated by gradually increasing the severity of these penalties. Thanks to this combination of features, GLO’s algorithm can, as now shown, tackle highly non-convex life-cycle problems.

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<sup>11</sup>See Torczon (1997) or Audet and Dennis (2003) for a general exposition.

<sup>12</sup>The general pattern search algorithm can also include a so-called search step in addition to the polling step, see Audet and Dennis (2003).

<sup>13</sup>A common pattern for the spanning directions is to vary only one dimension at a time, yet in both directions, thus setting  $J = 2N$  with  $D = \{(1, 0, \dots, 0), \dots, (0, 0, \dots, 1), (-1, 0, \dots, 0), \dots, (0, 0, \dots, -1)\}$ .


<sup>14</sup>If one chooses a complete polling, the point associated with the best objective function value is chosen. Alternatively, one could stop the polling after any improvement is found and go to the next iteration.

## 3.2 Testing the Algorithm

Figure 5 illustrates the convergence of GLO for the case of preference parameters ensuring, based on first-order conditions, perfectly flat age-consumption profiles. The figure shows, to the far left, our initial guess of these profiles. The subsequent columns display these profiles after 200, 400, 1000, and 5700 iterations of the algorithm, respectively. From left to right, the consumption path becomes smoother and smoother, finally reaching a completely flat profile – the analytic optimum. When it comes to the labor profile, going from left to right, the algorithm increasingly ‘discovers’ that it is optimal to stay either below the basic-income threshold or to work substantially more, i.e., lifetime utility maximization entails flipping between these two levels of labor supply. The algorithm meets the GLO’s convergence criterion after 5723 iterations, running for several minutes.

With fiscal kinks and notches, neither analytic solutions nor convergence proofs are available to test GLO’s accuracy. Hence, we assess accuracy by examining, in table 3, the difference in solutions associated with 200 different starting guesses. Specifically, we compute, for all 200 solutions, the percentage deviation in consumption equivalent variation (CEV), as defined in appendix A, from the best solution. Table 3 reports various percentiles of this distribution and does so for four different wage rates. For instance, we find that, for the high-wage case – an annual wage rate of \$130,000, the median solution deviates from the best solution by only 0.0001%, measured as a CEV. This is despite the fact that there is substantial labor-supply flipping due to the concave kink induced by FICA as discussed below. The GLO is less accurate when the wage rate is \$40,000 – a low enough wage to make the tax schedule’s notch relevant. But even in this case the median solution deviates from the best solution by less than one tenth of one percent. Considering the top one percent of solutions reduces that deviation by one to two orders of magnitude, which justifies our adjusting GLO’s algorithm to let it run to completion based on numerous initial guesses and then picking the best solution – a multi-start routine as is common in global optimization.

Figure 5: Convergence Process – Life-Cycle Profile From Starting Guess to Solution



Note: First column shows consumption and labor supply profiles of initial guess. Subsequent columns display these profiles after 200, 400, 1000, and 5700 iterations.

Table 3: Accuracy Assessment – Dependence of Objective From Starting Guess

Wage	1%	10%	Median	90%	Max	Std
20,000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000
40,000	-0.0023	-0.0362	-0.0779	-0.1414	-0.2718	0.0428
80,000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000
130,000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0001	-0.0005	-0.0013	0.0002

Note: Statistics for solving the life-cycle problem with 200 different starting guesses. Percentiles for the percentage deviation in CEV from the best solution are reported. E.g. the median solution of the \$40,000 wage-rate problem has a CEV of 0.0779 percent less than the CEV of the best solution, while this deviation is basically zero for the other reported wage rates.

## 4 Labor Supply Response to Kinks and Notches

In this section, we first analyse labor supply bunching as a response to convex kinks in the income-tax code leaving out FICA as well as the provision of basic income. Second, we add the FICA tax, which introduces a concave kink and thereby generates flipping behavior. Third, we examine the combination of flipping and bunching arising from including basic income and its associated notch. Finally, we discuss how kinks and notches can produce indeterminacy in the timing of labor supply, i.e., multiple choices of when to work, each of which delivers identical maximum lifetime utility. Most of this section assumes worker’s wages are fixed in real terms throughout their working years.


### 4.1 Bunching Due to Convex Kinks From Income-Tax Brackets

We start by focusing on the two income-tax kinks that are most convex – the jump in the marginal tax rate from 12 to 22 percent occurring at \$41,775 and the jump from 24 to 32 percent occurring at \$170,050. Consider two workers earning wage rates of \$35,000 and \$40,000 for one unit of labor supply (i.e. one year of full-time work). As figure 6 shows, the lower-wage worker works substantially more than the higher-wage worker.<sup>15</sup> As detailed below, this reflects the high-wage worker’s response to her much higher marginal tax rate. As a consequence, the higher-wage worker’s consumption is only 7.5 percent higher while earning 14.3 percent more per unit of labor. Figure 7 provides a similar picture for the case of high-wage-rate households in the vicinity of the convex kink at \$170,050.

Next, we consider the labor supply behavior for ranges of wage rates around the two highly convex kinks of the income tax code. Figure 8 shows how labor supply and labor income depend on the wage rate. For a substantial range of wage rates – from \$37,500 to \$39,500 – households chose to earn exactly \$41,775, the amount corresponding to the major convex kink at the lower end of the tax schedule. Within this range of wage rates, labor supply is strongly decreasing in the pre-tax wage. Starting at a wage of about \$40,000, households are willing to pay the higher marginal tax rate, and labor supply and income both increase. However, labor supply stays substantially below the labor supply of agents with lower wage rates. As shown in figure 9, the behavior is qualitatively similar at the other highly convex kink – \$170,050. The range of bunching wage rates, however, is much larger, ranging between \$154,000 and \$163,000.

<sup>15</sup>If we consider one unit of labor as the average number of hours worked in the U.S. in 2022, then a difference of five percentage points represents about 90 hours of work.

Figure 6: Life-Cycle Profiles of Low-Wage-Rate Households Facing Tax Code with Convex Kinks



Note: Life-cycle profiles for households facing labor taxation by the income tax code with convex kinks only (INC. tax). Consumption profiles are flat as interest rate and time preference rate are equal and asset income is not taxed. Both assumptions are for illustration and are relaxed below.

We now turn to bunching across time. Consider, in figure 10, bunching by a worker whose age-25 wage rate is \$109,184 and rises by 1% annually.<sup>16</sup> This worker's labor supply remains low for several years. Then it begins to rise, but not by enough to push the worker above the 24% bracket. This continues until they reach the \$170,050 bracket threshold. At this point, they reduce their labor supply each year for several years to avoid moving into the 32 percent bracket, which they eventually do.

<sup>16</sup>Note that the present value of this wage path is equal to the present value of earning a constant annual wage of \$130,000.

Figure 7: Life-Cycle Profiles of High-Wage-Rate Households Facing Tax Code with Convex Kinks






Figure 8: Bunching at the Convex Kink at \$41,775




Note: Labor supply and labor income as a function of the wage rate. Bunching occurs on the grey line, which represents the boundary between two tax brackets.

Figure 9: Bunching at the Convex Kink at \$170,050



Note: Labor supply and labor income as a function of the wage rate. Bunching occurs on the grey line, which represents the boundary between two tax brackets.


Figure 10: Bunching over the Life-Cycle When the Wage Rate Grows



Note: Life-Cycle profiles of high-wage-rate household with one percent yearly wage growth.



Figure 11: Life-Cycle Profiles of Households Facing Income Plus FICA Tax



## 4.2 Flipping due to FICA's Concave Kink


We next include the 12.4 percent FICA payroll tax with, to repeat, its ceiling (concave kink) at \$147,000. Figure 11 displays life-cycle profiles for households with annual wage rates of \$125,000 and \$130,000. Despite having flat consumption profiles, their labor supply profiles exhibit frequent flipping. In particular, agents are jumping back and forth between two tax brackets – below and above the FICA threshold of \$147,000. While the lower bracket is characterized by a higher marginal tax rate, continually working sufficient hours of work to exceed the FICA threshold in all periods is sub-optimal. At the same time, it would be also be sub-optimal to always stay below the threshold. Hence, the optimum entails working less in some years and more in others.

Figure 12 shows how labor supply and, thus, labor income are affected by the non-convex kink. Workers with wages between \$122,500 and \$135,500 flip. To be precise, they flip between low labor supply (the blue dots in the plot) that generates income substantially below the FICA threshold (grey line) and high labor supply (the red dots) that generates income much higher than the FICA threshold. Generating labor income close to the FICA threshold is never optimal – the exact opposite of bunching.

## 4.3 Bunching and Flipping Due to the Basic-Income Claw-Back Notch

We now turn to flipping and bunching due to the notch at \$15,000 in the tax and transfer scheme. Recall, the notch is generated by the assumption of a \$10,000 basic income that (single) households receive provided they earn less than \$15,000. Figure 13 displays the age-labor supply profile for

Figure 12: Flipping at the Concave Kink at \$147,000



Note: Labor supply and labor income as a function of the wage rate. Flipping occurs in the neighborhood of the lower grey line that represents the FICA threshold. Households earning between \$123,000 and \$134,500 flip between the blue and the red points. Households with lower or higher wage rates do not flip, corresponding to the green points.


workers with three different wage rates – \$30,000, \$38,000, and \$46,000. Figure 14 displays the labor supply and resulting labor income for a wide range of wage rates.

Workers with a wage rate below roughly \$30,000 reduce their labor supply each year to stay below the \$15,000 threshold. Starting from wage rates around \$46,000 individuals choose to never collect the basic income. Between these values, however, it’s optimal to collect basic income in some years and to earn substantially above the threshold in other years. In fact, it is never optimal to supply an amount of labor that generates anything strictly between the \$15,000 threshold for the basic benefit and the upper bound for the 12 percent tax bracket at \$41,775. Household who are flipping are saving substantial amounts in the periods they work. While one might argue that this is ruled out by assets tests in most real-world transfer schemes, we believe that such behavior is still relevant as there are often exceptions for assets like housing or cars and also because households can hide assets by ‘gifting’ to friends or relatives.

#### 4.4 Annual Labor Supply – the Potential for Indeterminacy and Hypersensitivity


Depending on a worker’s wage rate, the timing, if not the average level, of annual labor supply can be extremely sensitive to parameter values. Indeed, in the case we consider, where the interest rate and time preference rate are both precisely 2%, the timing of when flipping agents work part time and over time can be essentially indeterminate. This arises, in our model, around the FICA tax kink. Consider the \$130,000 wage-rate worker facing the full tax system, where the concave kink induced by the FICA threshold induces flipping. Figure 15 displays consumption, labor supply, and assets over the life-cycle for three different solutions of the household’s problem – the three best solutions from multiple different starts (different starting guesses for annual labor supply and consumption) of the GLO algorithm. The three solutions produce the same lifetime utility up to eight decimals. And

Figure 13: Life-Cycle Profiles of Low-Wage-Rate Households Facing Tax Code with Basic Income




Note: Life-cycle profiles for three different wage rates, one resulting in below-threshold labor supply throughout working life, one in above-threshold labor supply, while the intermediate wage-rate implies flipping between staying below and above the threshold.

Figure 14: Bunching and Flipping at the Notch at \$15,000



Note: Labor supply and labor income as a function of the wage rate. The notch at \$15,000 corresponds to the lower grey line. For wage rates between \$19,000 and \$45,000 it induces bunching. In addition, for wage rates between \$31,000 and \$45,000, there is flipping between blue and red points.

Figure 15: Indeterminacy in Annual Labor Supply of Households Flipping Around FICA Threshold




Note: Consumption, labor supply, and assets over the life-cycle for three different solutions of the problem of a household with wage rate \$130,000. Lifetime utilities are identical up to the eight decimal while the labor supply profiles differ strongly, in particular in terms of choice of periods in which the household works overtime (to exceed the FICA threshold) and in which it does not.

their age-consumption profiles (average consumption by age) differ by less than 0.01 percent. Yet, the timing of labor supply differs dramatically.<sup>17</sup>

Next, consider figure 16, which compares annual labor supply, saving, and consumption for two otherwise identical workers – one with a 2.0 percent and the other with a 1.9 percent time-preference rate. This minor difference in preferences produces a major difference in the age pattern of choice variables. When the worker has an equal time preference and interest rates, the age-consumption profile is, as expected, flat, but the annual earnings are indeterminate, flipping above and below the FICA threshold. Yet, if the worker has a slightly lower time-preference rate, the age-consumption profile rises and the age-labor supply monotonically declines, dropping sharply when earnings fall below the FICA threshold.

<sup>17</sup>Interestingly, in the second solution, the household works overtime for 22 periods, but for 23 periods in the other two solutions. Hence, the household is basically indifferent not only about when to work, but also how much to work.

Figure 16: Life-Cycle Profiles of \$130,000 Worker with Different Time-Preference Rates



Note: Consumption, labor supply, and assets over the life-cycle for two different time-discount rates,  $\rho$ , while the the interest rate in both cases is equal to 2%. The dotted gray line in the taxable-income panel indicates the FICA tax threshold.

## 5 Distortions of Labor Supply and Associated Excess Burdens

Table 4 reports our fiscal system’s impact on labor supply and saving compared with that arising under lump-sum taxation. In considering the results, bear in mind that a simple linear tax would make no difference to labor supply. When households face just the income-tax schedule with its convex kinks, labor supply is reduced by five to sixteen percent and this distortion tends to increase in the wage rate.<sup>18</sup> When the FICA tax is added to the schedule, labor supply is distorted substantially more, especially for those with low wage rates. Interestingly, the labor distortion is now no longer monotonically increasing in the wage rate, as marginal tax rates are no longer monotone. Finally, when we add basic income and its clawback at \$15,000, labor supply is massively distorted for low-wage households.

Of course, the labor supply distortions just described have a substantial impact on savings. Table 5 reports the percentage deviation of wealth at retirement relative to the corresponding lump-sum tax case. In our baseline tax scheme (last row) wealth accumulation is reduced substantially for all wage rates, with reductions ranging between 18% and 42%. Accumulated wealth inherits the non-monotonicity from the labor supply results. The largest reduction in savings is experienced by the low-wage rate workers, whereas the smallest reduction is experienced by households close to the FICA threshold.

<sup>18</sup>Intuitively, non-linearity accentuates substitution effects.

Table 4: Labor Supply Distortion

Ann. Wage	INC.	INC.+FICA	INC.+FICA+BASIC
25,000	-5.84	-11.51	-40.23
30,000	-5.84	-11.50	-51.14
35,000	-5.84	-11.50	-38.65
40,000	-11.04	-16.88	-28.95
50,000	-10.91	-16.65	-16.65
100,000	-11.69	-17.26	-17.26
130,000	-11.59	-13.79	-13.45
150,000	-11.55	-13.93	-13.93
200,000	-15.67	-16.41	-16.41

Notes: Percentage deviation of labor supply from the lump-sum taxation case for three different tax schemes (in rows) and many different wage rates (in columns).

Table 5: Impact on Wealth Accumulation

Ann. Wage	INC.	INC.+FICA	INC.+FICA+BASIC
25,000	-6.54	-14.56	-31.91
30,000	-6.54	-14.57	-42.16
35,000	-6.54	-14.58	-39.02
40,000	-12.32	-21.08	-30.78
50,000	-12.45	-21.29	-21.29
100,000	-13.94	-23.13	-23.13
130,000	-14.03	-18.31	-18.28
150,000	-14.07	-19.03	-21.93
200,000	-19.37	-22.24	-25.02

Notes: Percentage deviation of wealth at retirement from the lump-sum taxation case for three different tax schemes (in rows) and many different wage rates (in columns).

Analysis of the excess burden from taxation – the cost of distorting household consumption and leisure (labor supply and saving) decisions – dates to mid-19th century work by Jules Dupuit (see Ekelund Jr and Hébert, 2012). But Harberger (1964a) and Harberger (1964b) made excess burden analysis a mainstay of public finance. A multitude of studies applied Harberger’s approach to all manner of tax-induced distortions. Notable examples include Browning (1975), who examined distortions in labor supply from payroll taxation, Feldstein (1978) who analyzed saving distortions from taxing capital income, and Rosen (1978) who considers the excess burden of wage taxation.<sup>19,20</sup> We build on these traditional studies by measuring excess burdens when fiscal systems are NND.

To measure the distortions produced by our tax system, we follow the standard procedure – compare, as a consumption equivalent variation (CEV), distorted lifetime utility with lifetime utility under lump-sum taxation. CEV tells us the percentage increase in annual consumption that will raise a distorted worker’s lifetime utility to that enjoyed under lump-sum taxation. Appendix A provides the precise formula. To control for cash-flow constraints, we collect, from each worker at a given age,

<sup>19</sup>Auerbach (1985) and Auerbach and Hines (2002) provide extensive reviews of this literature.

<sup>20</sup>One shortcoming of Harberger’s approach is the failure to include decision margins that are not directly affected by the specific tax under consideration. Lindsey (1987), Feldstein (1995) and Auten and Carroll (1999) addressed this issue by estimating the responsiveness of taxable income to changes in tax rates.

the same lump-sum net taxes as they pay when facing one of three distorted tax systems. The first includes just the federal income-tax kinks, the second includes those kinks, plus the concave kink from the FICA tax, and the third includes all kinks plus basic income and the notch from its clawback.

Table 6’s third column shows that the full set of tax provisions produces huge distortions for low-wage workers. Take the \$30,000 worker. Their labor supply and saving decisions are distorted by 26.3% of their post-tax living standard. Despite having a full-time wage that is twice as high as the basic income notch, they choose to earn only \$15,000 per year for their entire working life. This leaves them paying negative net taxes of about \$6,500 per year. Hence, the real tax burden this worker faces delivers no positive revenue. It simply reflects having their choice of labor supply and, thus saving, heavily distorted. Compared with lump-sum taxation, their annual labor supply is 51 percent lower and their wealth at retirement is 42 percent lower.

The massive fiscal burden arising solely from distorting behavior drops dramatically for workers earning \$50,000 or more. But even an excess burden ranging from 3 to 5 percent is non-trivial. As the difference between the tables’ first two and third columns shows, federal income taxes produce, on their own, small excess burdens apart from the those earning \$200,000 pre-tax. It’s moderate when we add in the concave FICA kink. The table’s bottom line, then, is that providing basic income with a severe clawback may, inadvertently, lock the poor into poverty.

Table 6: Excess Burden of Different Tax Schemes

Ann. Wage	INC.	INC.+FICA	INC.+FICA+BASIC
25,000	0.42	2.04	13.82
30,000	0.42	2.04	26.32
35,000	0.42	2.04	26.08
40,000	1.52	4.47	16.60
50,000	1.54	4.52	4.52
100,000	1.91	5.31	5.31
130,000	1.92	3.56	3.56
150,000	1.93	3.46	3.46
200,000	3.74	4.85	4.85

Notes: Excess burden relative to lump-sum taxation for three different tax schemes (in rows) and many different wage rates (in columns). Excess burdens are measured by the consumption equivalent variation defined in Appendix A.

## 5.1 Sensitivity to Frisch Elasticity

Figure 7 examines labor supply and saving responses to our tax system, as well as their associated excess burdens, when the Frisch elasticity is 0.5 rather than 1. Labor supply is measured as the percentage change in its average value over the work span. The impact on saving is captured by the percentage change in wealth at retirement. Remarkably, the distortions in labor supply and wealth at retirement, measured relative to what would arise under lump-sum net taxation, remain remarkably large when the model’s intrinsic force for substitution, the Frisch elasticity, is only half as big. Indeed, for workers with wage rates of \$25,000 and \$30,000, labor supply and saving responses are essentially unchanged. And excess burden is actually larger. The same is close to true for the worker in the table with a \$130,000 wage rate. Although there is a somewhat smaller reduction in average labor supply, wealth at retirement actually falls by more with the lower elasticity. Even more surprising,

the excess burden is somewhat higher. In the table’s other six cases, the results are as expected – smaller behavioral distortions and excess burdens.

How can less willingness to change labor supply in response to a change in the net wage – a lower Frisch elasticity in the context of our preferences – lead to larger fiscal policy-induced behavioral changes and excess burdens? Our answer is that the Frisch elasticity impacts the choice of labor supply both with and without policy. A lower elasticity can position a worker near a notch or kink or far away depending on the nature of the policies adopted. Hence, a worker with a lower Frisch elasticity can face greater work disincentives than those with a higher Frisch elasticity because the labor and work distortions they face are greater. Stated differently, the Frisch elasticity tells us about responses to linear wage taxation, not responses to NND tax systems.

Table 7: Labor Supply, Saving, and Excess Burdens when Assuming a 50% Lower Frisch Elasticity

Ann Wage	Labor Supply		Wealth		Excess Burden	
	$\gamma = 1$	$\gamma = 0.5$	$\gamma = 1$	$\gamma = 0.5$	$\gamma = 1$	$\gamma = 0.5$
25,000	-40.23	-40.15	-31.91	-34.28	13.82	19.20
30,000	-51.14	-50.74	-42.16	-43.85	26.32	34.87
35,000	-38.65	-18.99	-39.02	-26.78	26.08	15.67
40,000	-28.95	-10.97	-30.78	-17.02	16.60	2.58
50,000	-16.65	-11.92	-21.29	-18.48	4.52	3.15
100,000	-17.26	-12.46	-23.13	-19.98	5.31	3.73
130,000	-13.45	-12.37	-18.28	-20.14	3.56	3.78
150,000	-13.93	-7.69	-21.93	-14.00	3.46	1.45
200,000	-16.41	-10.66	-25.02	-17.85	4.85	2.78

Notes: Percentage deviation of average labor supply and wealth at retirement in the full tax system from the respective lump-sum taxation case. Comparing our baseline case of  $\gamma = 1$  with  $\gamma = 0.5$ . Excess burdens are measured by the consumption equivalent variation defined in Appendix A.

## 6 Extensions

Can the GLO handle discrete choice, joint taxation of spouses, and intertemporally intertwined tax systems, specifically, income, not wage, taxation? Yes, as this section shows. This is expected. Given GLO’s solution method, there is nothing special about these cases or, indeed, incorporating additional elements, such as a distaste for participation in welfare programs or other fiscal provisions emphasized by Moffitt (1983).<sup>21</sup> Each of the extensions considered below use our original GLO parameters. Certainly, tweaking these parameters can improve performance. But the fact that tweaking isn’t needed shows the robustness of the GLO algorithm.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup>Another example is incorporating adjustment costs from changing the amount of labor supplied from one year to the next. Such costs may be particularly important for employed workers.


<sup>22</sup>The GLO takes less than three minutes to process a household’s globally optimal behavior. Hence, with parallel processing, one can, it seems, process an entire data set in several minutes. This remarkable speed can facilitate empirical analysis that incorporates benefit-program participation preferences, labor-supply adjustment costs, Akerlof (1978)’s efficient *tagging* of benefits to agent characteristics, and other factors.



## 6.1 Discrete Labor Supply

Figure 17 considers a \$125,000-wage worker who is limited to working either full time or part time. Full time (half time) is defined as 1.2 (0.6) units of labor supply in a period. The left-hand panel is based on the same preferences used above. The right-hand panel multiplies the disutility of work in each period by 1.1. The solid blue curve shows the optimal age-labor supply profile when labor supply is discrete. The dotted curve shows the corresponding fully flexible labor-supply case. In the left panel, restricting labor supply leads to no flipping when flipping would otherwise arise. In the right panel, the opposite occurs: Optimal discrete choice features flipping when optimal flexible choice entails fixed annual labor supply. This has important implications for estimating structural labor-supply models. It suggests that assuming discrete choice to make one's model computationally tractable may be problematic.

Figure 17: Comparing Discrete and Continuous Labor Choice




Note: Labor supply of worker with \$125,000 wage rate who is either restricted to full-time or part-time work (discrete labor) or not restricted (flexible labor). The left-hand side assumes our standard disutility of labor parameter –  $\chi = 1$ . The right-hand assumes  $\chi = 1.1$ . In case of flexible labor, the household flips around the FICA threshold when  $\chi = 1$ , yet stays below that threshold when  $\chi = 1.1$ . In the discrete-labor case the household works full time throughout his working age when  $\chi = 1$ , yet occasionally works part time when  $\chi = 1.1$ .

## 6.2 Taxing Couples

Taxing couples on joint income renders the two spouses' labor-supply decisions interdependent. To examine this inter-dependency, we assume that both household members are the same age and live for  $T$  periods with joint lifetime utility given by

$$\sum_{t=1}^T \left( \frac{1}{1 + \rho_t} \right)^{t-1} U(c_{1,t}, c_{2,t}, l_{1,t}, l_{2,t}), \quad (5)$$

Figure 18: Labor Supply When Couples are Taxed Jointly or Separately



Note: Labor supply and taxable family income over the life cycle for three different types of couples. In the first case, both earners coordinate to collect basic income in some periods. In the second case, the primary earner flips around the FICA threshold. In the third case the primary earner increases labor supply substantially when taxed jointly to make use of lower marginal rates.

where  $c_i$  and  $l_i$  are consumption and labor supply of household member  $i = 1, 2$ . Per-period utility satisfies:

$$U(c_1, c_2, l_1, l_2) = 2 \cdot \log \left( \frac{c_1 + c_2}{2} \right) - \frac{l_1^{1+\gamma}}{1 + 1/\gamma} - \frac{l_2^{1+\gamma}}{1 + 1/\gamma}. \quad (6)$$

Thus, spouses value average consumption, whereas their two disutilities of labor supply are simply added together. Both spouses retire at 65, both have the same time-preference rate, and both have the same Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Although, positing couples facing joint taxation adds another labor-supply path over which the GLO must optimize, the program readily handles this. To be clear,

we continue to randomly adjust two values of either consumption or labor supply in each iteration of our stochastic pattern-search routine. But now the two random adjustments are chosen from the set of annual labor supplies of each spouse and the annual levels of the two spouses' common consumption. Under *joint taxation*, household wage income is pooled and subject to the same marginal tax rates as in table 2, but with doubled levels of tax brackets. Under *separate taxation*, each spouse's wages are taxed separately according to table 2. The FICA tax treats spouses as single. As for the provision of basic income, couples whose joint labor earnings are less than \$30,000 receive \$20,000.


Figure 18 displays the labor supply of each spouse as well as taxable family labor income. Each row references a different couple with the higher earner's wage displayed in the first column and the lower earner's wage shown in the second column. The third column displays the couple's total taxable labor income. Blue lines reference the case of joint taxation and red lines denote separate taxation. The first row considers a relatively low-wage couple with wage rates of \$50,000 and \$30,000. There are two remarkable findings. First, under both tax schemes the two household members coordinate to work less in some periods in order to collect the basic income. Second, when comparing the two tax schedules, joint taxation discourages the secondary earner from working, leaving him working substantially fewer hours. This reduces overall taxable family income although joint taxation results in lower average taxes for any given pair of labor supply choices. This second observation also pertains to the case of our higher earning couple, with high and low spousal wage rates of \$110,000 and \$80,000, respectively. In this case, the primary earner flips her labor supply above and below the FICA threshold. The secondary earner, in contrast, works the same amount at all ages.

The third row considers a couple with even higher wage rates – \$130,000 and \$100,000. There is no longer any flipping: the primary earner stays above the FICA threshold while the secondary earner stays below. However, in this case, joint taxation not only lowers the secondary earner's labor supply. It also substantially increases the primary earner's labor supply. Consequently, taxable family income increases. In all three cases, the gap between the amount of labor supplied by the primary earner and the secondary earner increases in switching from separate to joint taxation. Joint taxation is always preferred by our married households. The welfare gain is substantial for the low-income case – roughly a 5 percent gain. It's marginal for the higher-earning couple – less than one percent.

### 6.3 Taxing Total Income

So far, we've focused on labor-income taxation to isolate its impact on labor supply. We now apply the federal tax schedule and the basic income clawback threshold to total income, while the FICA taxation still applies just to labor income. Figure 19 displays age-labor supply profiles for workers with wage rates of \$30,000, \$38,000, and \$46,000 dollars as in figure 13. The consumption profile are now generally downward sloping as capital-income taxation discourages saving. Stated differently, it encourages current over future consumption. Similarly labor supply tends to be upward sloping since capital-income taxation favors working more when old (taking leisure earlier). However, labor supply exhibits a much richer behavior. The red line shows slightly downward sloping labor supply as long as the household collects basic income. The blue line exhibits flipping for the first half of the working life and then increasing work. The green line flips down once and exhibits upward sloping behavior for the rest of the agent's pre-retirement years.

Figure 19: Life-Cycle Profiles When Taxing Total Income



## 7 Conclusion

This paper develops the Global Life-Cycle Optimizer to study the impacts typical elements of fiscal policy can have on work and saving decisions. The GLO is a stochastic pattern-search algorithm specifically designed to determine optimal economic behavior in the context of non-differentiable, non-convex, and discontinuous (NND) choice sets. Economists have long recognized the NND nature of household budgets and the need for global optimization. But computational and algorithmic limitations generally restricted their analyses to static models with a limited set of policies, labor-supply options, or both. The GLO changes this playing field.

To demonstrate the GLO's potential, we consider labor income as well as total income taxation within a simplified U.S. fiscal system comprising three elements – the federal personal income-tax brackets, the Social Security payroll tax with its ceiling, and the provision of basic income to workers earning below a threshold. This tax system comprises eight differently-sized kinks (seven convex and one concave) and one notch. The GLO readily reproduces the anomalous behavior that theory predicts and data record – the bunching of earnings just below benefit-eligibility or higher marginal-tax thresholds. But it also produces a) flipping – switching in different years between over-time work (high labor supply) and part-time work (low labor supply), b) rising, then falling, then rising labor supply over the work span of workers with increasing real wages seeking to avoid bracket creep, and c) potential extreme sensitivity of the level and pattern of annual labor supply to parameter values. Of most surprise is the wide range of wages over which labor supply is dramatically altered. This is particularly true for low-wage workers, some of who reduce their labor supply by more than 50 percent in the course of bunching their wages. Compared with lump-sum taxation, low-wage workers with a unitary Frisch elasticity of labor supply, experience excess burdens exceeding 26 percent of lifetime spending. For those unaffected by the notch, excess burdens are moderate.

As we show, the GLO can handle discrete choice, joint taxation of married couple’s labor supplies, and taxation based on alternative tax bases. Furthermore, the GLO seems fully capable of simultaneously handling cash-flow constraints, fixed costs of working, minimum and maximum hours restrictions, preferences toward benefit-program participation, labor supply adjustment costs, and benefit-program participation costs.<sup>23</sup> Inclusion of adjustment costs would surely limit the amount of flipping.<sup>24</sup> Agents who would otherwise flip absent adjustment costs would likely choose to work full time for part of their work span and part time for the remainder. This would manifest as early retirement. As for empirical analysis, preferences can, as in Burtless and Hausman (1978), be unobserved by the econometrician and, as in MaCurdy et al. (1990), variables can be measured with error. Simulated maximum likelihood (Lerman and Manski, 1981) as well as simulated method of moments (McFadden, 1989; Pakes and Pollard, 1989) can be used in conjunction with the GLO to measure preference and other parameters, such as adjustment costs governing switching from part time to over time work. The GLO also seems ideal for evaluating tax reforms. With a large and extensive data set and careful delineation of prevailing fiscal policies, one can compare GLO’s results under current policy with that under proposed alternative policies – and do so on a state-by-state basis. This can include radical tax simplifications that can be predicated, as in Akerlof (1978), on observable characteristics. Comparisons can also cover macro aggregates as well as household-by-household labor supply, saving, and welfare changes. Hence, the tool can be used to search for Pareto-improving reforms. Although the GLO’s capacities to handle the full U.S. fiscal system remain to be seen, preliminary work with the Fiscal Analyzer, which encompasses the entire potpourri of U.S. federal and state policy (see Auerbach et al., 2023), suggests no difficulties. Intuitively, altering GLO’s annual net tax function changes nothing fundamental.

A tougher challenge is incorporating uncertainty beyond that facing econometricians, namely macro shocks and idiosyncratic uncertainties impacting households. One approach, which could readily be implemented with our current version of the GLO, is to follow Cai and Judd (2023) and assume certainty-equivalent behavior. Agents, in this case, make decisions in each period as if all future shocks equal their expected values. This transforms lifetime uncertainty problems into sequences of deterministic problems, which, as we’ve seen, the GLO can readily handle. The concern here is whether this approach properly captures risk averse behavior, specifically precautionary consumption and labor supply. The standard, but far more challenging path toward handling uncertainty requires the use of dynamic programming. A variant of the GLO might be used to find optimal policies in each step of value function iteration. While the GLO will likely be up to this task, a major additional challenge arises: interpolating the resulting non-differentiable value function accurately.<sup>25</sup>

A final point. One might reasonably ask whether individual households can make the calculations being modeled and processed by GLO. Complex fiscal provisions are, after all, a postwar phenomenon, not problems human brains have evolved to solve. Our response is twofold. First, observed earnings bunching shows that households can comprehend and appropriately respond to at least some forms of fiscal non-linearities. Second, over time, computation algorithms, like the GLO, will surely assist households in making optimal life-cycle labor supply and saving decisions. Future economists will likely prescribe optimal life-cycle choices not study computational mistakes that are easy to mischaracterize as behavioral shortcomings.

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<sup>23</sup>Moffitt (1983), Fraker and Moffitt (1988), and Moffitt (1992) incorporate decisions over plan participation.

<sup>24</sup>Adjustment costs may reflect search time needed to find jobs that permit desired hours of work. They can also reflect loss of firm-specific human capital, reduced accumulation of human capital, and depreciation of human capital.

<sup>25</sup>A potential way to interpolate the value function in several dimensions while preserving monotonicity and concavity is Delaunay interpolation as employed in Brumm and Grill (2014).

## APPENDIX

### A Consumption Equivalent Variation

Denote lifetime utility by

$$W(c, l) = \sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{t-1} U(c_t, l_t), \text{ with } \beta = \left( \frac{1}{1 + \rho} \right). \quad (7)$$

Let  $(c^0, l^0)$  and  $(c^1, l^1)$  be consumption and labor supply under the considered tax system and under lump-sum taxation, respectively. Then the consumption equivalent variation (CEV) is defined by the following equality:

$$W(c^0(1 + CEV), l^0) = W(c^1, l^1).$$

For the LHS we get:

$$\begin{aligned} W(c^0(1 + CEV), l^0) &= \sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{t-1} U(c_t^0(1 + CEV), l_t^0) \\ &= \sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{t-1} \left( \log[c_t^0(1 + CEV)] - \chi \frac{(l_t^0)^{1+1/\gamma}}{1 + 1/\gamma} \right) \\ &= \sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{t-1} \left( \log(c_t^0) + \log(1 + CEV) - \chi \frac{(l_t^0)^{1+1/\gamma}}{1 + 1/\gamma} \right) \\ &= \sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{t-1} \left( \log(c_t^0) - \chi \frac{(l_t^0)^{1+1/\gamma}}{1 + 1/\gamma} \right) + \sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{t-1} \log(1 + CEV) \\ &= W(c^0, l^0) + \sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{t-1} \log(1 + CEV). \end{aligned}$$

Combining the above equations results in:

$$\begin{aligned} W(c^0(1 + CEV), l^0) &= W(c^1, l^1) \\ \Leftrightarrow W(c^0, l^0) + \sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{t-1} \log(1 + CEV) &= W(c^1, l^1) \\ \Leftrightarrow \sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{t-1} \log(1 + CEV) &= W(c^1, l^1) - W(c^0, l^0) \\ \Leftrightarrow CEV &= \exp \left( \frac{W(c^1, l^1) - W(c^0, l^0)}{\sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{t-1}} \right) - 1. \end{aligned}$$

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